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I think there’s always a struggle between learning more specific details about a topic and being able to communicate the ideas to a general audience. #SciComm is a challenge and I’m always impressed when people can do it well in a way that doesn’t obscure the truth.
Some things really do take a lot of dedicated study to understand, especially complex things like the nervous systems. “If our brains were simple enough for us to understand them, we’d be so simple that we couldn’t” -Ian Stewart. At the same time, most people can get the jyst of a lot of it if the information is presented in a way that they can relate to. Even if the info is compressed in a lossy way, people from any background are themselves complex and can understand a lot, but definitely the challenge is to present it in a way that they can access given their domain of expertise, which is vastly different for each person.
It probably helps to open the door for people. I got hooked on neuroscience partially from pop sci books, they lead me towards the details, but I had to stay dedicated and do the work of going into the details and sticking with it. Maybe if I picked up a jargon-heavy piece of writing that went off about something like afterhyperpolarization I wouldn’t have stuck with it, but now after ~10 years of studying it I’m all about those esoteric particulars.
Yes, I agree with your words – though not Ian’s quote :).
(And thanks for this opportunity to consolidate and express below).
In case I need to correct a miscommunication – I’m not arguing against specialist knowledge per-se:
- Specialist knowledge is essential, in principle; a simple consequence of ‘more is different’ – that we must map that difference, for each and every phenomena (or family, or scope thereof)
Consider though, that there is a difference between useful and correct specialist knowledge (or understanding) – this distinction is difficult to notice from within any useful framework of understanding, because ‘correct’ is not expressible in terms of ‘useful though not correct’ – so specialist knowledge which is only useful might, circumstantially, obscure, distract or mislead.
Elsewhere, I’ve explored ways to break this down formally, with some ‘fundamental elements of’ set and category theory: this conversation presents some the same ideas in prose, which is interesting (to me at least!).
Consider that when describing complex phenomena in general terms, we are in fact recasting singular distinction in terms of constituent (or compositional) commonality. I appreciate that in prose, this might appear to be ’too informal for much use’
But by doing so, we are allowing ourselves to see past ‘possibly distracting or misleading’ detail of respective ‘useful but not correct’ understanding; and I suggest that this is a legitimate form of informal formal analysis.
Complete that analysis of this kind might require enumerating all possible generalisations, across all contexts.
At that point, for ‘useful but not correct’ understandings, we ought to see: 1) a ‘remainder’, of details which are not associated with any one of the generalisations; 2) if we frame that enumeration process outside the understanding in question (in the broader context of all territory whether-mapped-or-not), we might also expect to illuminate generalisations which do not apply to our previous ‘useful but not correct’ understanding.
Our difference between useful and correct.
Crucially, this is not possible from any prior ‘useful but not correct’ understanding (unless individuals sufficiently de-emphasise all sentimentally held or revered details, etc).
We see this (nearly) everywhere in practice (outside of scientific disciplines), when we call in impartial externals to reconcile previously irreconcilable concerns (business analysts for dysfunctional departments; writing editors cutting through redundant story; etc).
science does need this. this is in-effect what happens when new scientists differently interpret territory, for kuhns revolutions – but only if allowed to venture outside of inherited constraints
–why not open this up formally?
On the Ian Stewart quote – i’m not familiar with the context (so please correct me where I misunderstand) – but I think I disagree profoundly – crudely simplifying, ‘####’ apathy (!); for the same reasons as above, really, but I might take the opportunity to elaborate briefly (thanks).
Consider the-space-of-all:
- Implementation: every phenomena inherits characteristics from priors (later constituents) (characteristics: continued; or suppressed), ‘more is different, all the way back’
- Form: a distinct ‘causal signature’ (if you will); the general case, of legal stable form
- Application: the distinct ‘causal signature’ of every phenomena (and variation) is evaluated (or profiled) (by science) across arbitrarily numerous circumstances, to map applicability, to a ‘causal profile’ (if you will)
The space-of-all-implementation and space-of-all-application of any phenomena, is (nearly always) vastly more complex than the space-of-all-form, because the former includes inherited characteristics of each generation of ‘more is different’, ‘all the way back’; and the latter includes all possible variants of form, respective to circumstances of application.
Concretely, consider:
- The complexity of the-space-of-all-implementation of the human musculoskeletal system
- the complexity of the corresponding space-of-all-application {action; gesture; interaction; locomotion; etc}
Simplifying for brevity:
- All of that implementation can be simplified to a fairly basic mechanical account (and model), in terms of sticks, pivots and ‘contracting blobs’ (suggestions welcome!)
- Such that consequently, the entire space-of-all-application can be explained in terms of the same fundamentally-basic account and model; which is predictive; relative to implementation and application, simple (in principle);
- All additional complexity comes from evaluating the general model, across formal variants, and plural circumstances. The general form consolidates origin, to frame (and constrain) all application
- Every phenomena is a nexus which aligns the space-of-all-implementation and thee-space-of-all-application
The view from over here, as an impartial external, is undoubtedly different.
But, now consider the mind: complex implementation, and complex application sure; but biological and evolutionary precedent is clear, and both are aligned by a singular, relatively simple general form, of relatively few distinct parts, which consolidates, frames and constrains.
I feel like this is accessible; I am writing a book which will make the case in detail, with models and philosophical and practical demonstrations, but I’d love to hear where I might improve communication, or where I lost you! :).
If you have followed this far, thank you.
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